The District Courts Act was drafted in the 1960s and has been patched since. Situations arise that it does not address. The answer depends on whether what is missing is a power or a procedure.
Power or procedure?
The District Court has only the powers the statute gives it: Ex parte the Acting Public Prosecutor [1976] PNGLR 344. If the Act does not confer a power, no amount of borrowing from the National Court will create one. In Malipu v Laka (2025) N11322 the National Court quashed a District Court dismissal for want of prosecution because no such power appears in section 25. See is the District Court a court of record.
Procedure is different. Where the Act gives the Court a task but does not say how to perform it, the Act and the Regulation each contain a gap-filling rule.
Regulation 46: supplying deficiencies
Where in this Regulation there is no provision, or no sufficient provision, for or in respect of any matter or thing, then the Court may supply the deficiency, or allow it to be supplied, in such manner as may be just and proper, and for that purpose regard may be had to any relevant or analogous practice, procedure or form in use by, or for the purposes of, the National Court.
The National Court’s practice is in the National Court Rules 1983. A magistrate faced with an application to join a party, to consolidate two complaints, or to receive evidence by affidavit can look to the corresponding Order of those Rules for a procedure. In Getsi v PNG Harbours Board [1993] PNGLR 408 Doherty J observed that there is no clear procedure in the Act for joinder of parties, but the rules of natural justice require that a person to be joined must have notice and a right to be heard. That is regulation 46 at work: the gap is filled, but only in a way that is just and proper.
Sections 131 and 142: how a hearing runs
In respect of the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and the right of addressing the Court in reply, or otherwise, the practice before a Court on the hearing of an information (section 131) or of a complaint (section 142) shall be in accordance, as nearly as practicable, with the practice for the time being in the National Court on the trial of an issue of fact in an action at law.
These provisions settle the order of proceedings at a hearing: who opens, who calls evidence first, the right to cross-examine, re-examination, and closing addresses. They do not import the National Court’s pleadings, discovery or interlocutory machinery, which is why a District Court civil case is started by a simple complaint rather than a writ.
Section 22: the same relief as the National Court
Subject to this Act, a Court as regards a cause of action for the time being within its jurisdiction shall, in proceedings before it, (a) grant such relief, redress or remedy, or combination of remedies, whether absolute or conditional; and (b) give the same effect to every ground of defence or counterclaim, whether equitable or legal, as ought to be granted or given in a similar case by the National Court and in as full and ample a manner.
This is the provision that lets the District Court grant equitable relief, including restraining orders, on a cause of action it can hear. It is limited by its opening words: the cause of action must already be within jurisdiction. It cannot be used to hear a claim about title to land, which section 21(4)(f) excludes. See injunctions and equitable relief.
If the magistrate refuses to act at all
(1) Where a Magistrate refuses to do an act relating to the duties of his office, the party requiring the act to be done may apply to the National Court or a Judge, on affidavit of the facts, for an order calling on the Magistrate and the party to be affected to show cause why the act should not be done, and if good cause is not shown the National Court may make the order absolute, with or without costs.
(2) A Magistrate, on being served with an order absolute, shall obey the order and do the act.
This is the Act’s own version of mandamus. Its limits were explained in R v Wewak Resident Magistrate; Ex parte Dyer [1967–68] PNGLR 511: the remedy lies where a magistrate has improperly declined to exercise jurisdiction, not where the magistrate has exercised it and reached a conclusion the applicant dislikes. The Court could not order a magistrate who had found the evidence insufficient to commit a defendant for trial, or to form a contrary opinion. For that the remedy is an appeal or, where the process itself has miscarried, judicial review.
Other provisions that fill gaps
| Situation | Provision |
|---|---|
| No time is fixed for a step | Interpretation Act s 12: it is to be done with all convenient speed |
| The form used is not the prescribed one | Regulation s 2(2) and s 44: similar forms suffice; departure does not void the proceeding unless the Court directs |
| The garnishee disputes the debt and the issue is outside the District Court’s jurisdiction | Act ss 185–186: the issue may be ordered to be tried in any court in which it could have been tried |
| A matter is too big or too serious for the District Court | Act s 23: the Court abstains and commits or transfers; s 24: transfer to another District Court or to the National Court |
The District Courts Act and Regulation are not on PacLII; both are on vLex (Act, Regulation).
Before relying on anything here, read the current text of the District Courts Act (Chapter 40) and check for later amendments. The Act is not on PacLII; the figures and time limits quoted in this series come from the consolidation to No 8 of 2000, and the District Courts (Amendment) Act 2009 changes some of them once it is brought into operation. If a decision matters to you, get advice — start with the Office of the Public Solicitor, or find a firm in the law firms directory.