The phrase “court of record” sounds like a technicality. In the District Court it decides real questions: whether a magistrate can change a sentence the next day, whether the Court can jail someone for breaching its order, and where a power has to come from.
What the Supreme Court held
The District Courts of Papua New Guinea are not courts of record but creatures of statute and as such have only those powers vested in them by statute. Accordingly, the sentencing power of a magistrate is exhausted once he has pronounced sentence; he has, subject to the court’s power to correct a slip, no power to make any alteration which amounts to a fresh adjudication.
In that case a magistrate convicted a man of possessing goods reasonably suspected of being stolen, sentenced him to two and a half months’ imprisonment, then after an adjournment took further evidence and suspended the sentence on a good behaviour bond. The Supreme Court quashed the suspension and restored the original sentence. Once the sentence was pronounced, the magistrate was functus officio.
The contrast with the National Court
The Constitution makes the National Court a superior court of record under section 163(2), and the Supreme Court a superior court of record under section 160(2), each with power to punish contempt of court. Section 42(1)(b) refers to detention under the order of a court of record punishing contempt of itself or another court. The District Court is not in that class. Its powers begin and end with the District Courts Act and the other Acts that confer jurisdiction on it.
Four consequences
| Consequence | Where it bites |
|---|---|
| No inherent jurisdiction | A power must be found in the Act. The National Court’s power under Constitution section 155(4) to make orders necessary to do justice belongs to the National and Supreme Courts, not to a magistrate |
| Functus officio | After a conviction and sentence, or a final order, the magistrate cannot reopen the matter except through a power the Act provides, such as setting aside an ex parte order under section 25 or a default order under section 159 |
| Limited contempt power | Section 277 creates offences of interrupting the Court, disrespect, obstruction and prevarication, with fines of up to K200. Disobedience of an order made outside court is not contempt in the District Court; it is enforced under section 171 or Part IX |
| Procedure by borrowing | Where the Act and Regulation are silent, regulation 46 lets the Court supply the deficiency by reference to National Court practice, and sections 131 and 142 apply National Court trial practice “as nearly as practicable” |
In Malipu v Laka (2025) N11322 the National Court quashed a chain of District Court orders because the magistrate had dismissed a complaint for want of prosecution, a power the Court found is not among those prescribed by section 25 for an application to set aside an ex parte order, and had then made further orders on that flawed footing. Kangwia J treated the orders as legally and procedurally flawed and remitted the case for rehearing. The lesson is the 1976 one restated: a magistrate has the powers the Act gives, and no others.
What a magistrate can still correct
The 1976 decision preserved the Court’s power to correct a slip: an accidental error in recording an order, as distinct from a change of mind. The Act itself adds several curative provisions. Section 163 provides that a conviction or order is not void for a defect in form or substance if the National Court is satisfied that sufficient grounds were in proof to have authorised it, and the National Court may amend it. Section 207 saves a warrant of commitment or execution from being void for want of form where there is a good conviction or order behind it. Sections 245 and 246 sustain a conviction despite the absence of an information or summons where the defendant was present and did not object, and despite a wrong distribution of the penalty. What none of these permits is a fresh adjudication.
It still keeps a record
The phrase is also a reminder of how to read the Act. Where a section says the Court “may” do something, that is the whole of the power; where it says the Court “shall”, there is no discretion to depart from it; and where it says nothing, the power does not exist. A litigant who wants an order should be able to point to the section that authorises it, and a litigant resisting one should ask the magistrate to identify it.
Not being a court of record does not mean the Court keeps no record. Section 160 requires a signed minute or memorandum of every conviction or order, section 145 requires civil evidence to be taken down in writing and signed by the witnesses, and section 65 requires committal depositions to be reduced to writing, read over and signed. Those documents are the foundation of any appeal. See what records the Court keeps.
The District Courts Act is not on PacLII; it is available on vLex.
Before relying on anything here, read the current text of the District Courts Act (Chapter 40) and check for later amendments. The Act is not on PacLII; the figures and time limits quoted in this series come from the consolidation to No 8 of 2000, and the District Courts (Amendment) Act 2009 changes some of them once it is brought into operation. If a decision matters to you, get advice — start with the Office of the Public Solicitor, or find a firm in the law firms directory.