Two different Acts set the time limits, and which one applies depends on whether the victim lived or died. Both are absolute in the sense that, once the period has passed, an extension of time to give notice under section 54(6) will not help.
Personal injury: six years from the accident
A claim for bodily injury against MVIL is, in substance, an action in tort, and section 16(1)(a) of the Frauds and Limitations Act 1988 provides that an action “founded on simple contract or on tort” shall not be brought after the expiration of six years commencing on the date on which the cause of action accrued.
When does the cause of action accrue? The National Court in Kuri v Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd [2004] PGNC 48; N2759 reasoned that because notice under section 54(6) is essential to the claim, the cause of action against MVIL arose only when the notice was given, so that a writ issued more than six years after the accident but within six years of the notice was in time. The Supreme Court reversed that decision in Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd v Kuri [2006] PGSC 7; SC825: the notice “is not an element of the cause of action of tort, it is a condition precedent to the right to issue a writ”, and it “does not have any effect on when the cause of action arose”. The cause of action accrued on the day of the accident, 16 March 1996, and the action issued more than six years later was statute-barred and dismissed.
Clock one: six months from the accident to give MVIL notice of intention to claim (section 54(6)), extendable on sufficient cause. Clock two: six years from the accident to file the writ for injury (Frauds and Limitations Act s 16), or three years from the death for a dependency claim (Wrongs Act s 31). Clock two is not extendable, and obtaining an extension on clock one does not stop it.
Death: three years from the death
A claim by the dependants of a person killed in a motor accident is a claim under Part IV of the Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Chapter 297). Section 31 provides that “only one action under this Part lies for and in respect of the same subject-matter of complaint, and every such action must be commenced within three years after the death of the deceased person”.
Claimants have argued that the six-year period in the Frauds and Limitations Act should apply instead. The Supreme Court rejected the argument in Ambo v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust [2002] PGSC 21; SC681. The action for damages for a death is not a common law action in tort; it is created by statute, the Wrongs Act, and section 37(6) of that Act specifically deems the insurer a tortfeasor in section 54 cases. Under Schedule 2.2 of the Constitution the common law applies only where it is not inconsistent with a statute, so section 31 governs. Ambo upheld Lipai v MVIT [1996] PGLawRp 742; [1996] PNGLR 363 (death 4 January 1991; writ after 4 January 1994; claim barred) and Ambo v MVIT [1999] PGNC 124; N2162 at first instance.
The rule is applied strictly. In Lama v Motor Vehicle Insurance Ltd [2025] PGNC 461; N11612 a four-month-old baby was injured in June 2016 and died a year later after twelve months of treatment. The father sought an extension of time to give notice in 2025. The court refused: even if sufficient cause were shown, the claim had been barred since June 2020, three years after the death, and a person whose cause of action is statute-barred is not a “claimant” within section 54(6).
Limitation and default judgment
Limitation is a defence. It must be pleaded, and if MVIL lets default judgment be entered against it, it is too late. In Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd v Kiangua [2015] PGSC 70; SC1476 the Supreme Court held it was not competent for MVIL to raise section 31 of the Wrongs Act on an appeal against the assessment of damages, because that was inconsistent with the default judgment on liability, and in any event no defence had been filed.
Joining the owner or driver after the period
Where a claimant wants damages above the K150,000 cap, the owner or driver must be joined so that the excess can be awarded against them under section 54(5). Pierce v MVIT [1989] PGLawRp 53; [1988-89] PNGLR 480 held that the National Court Rules should not be applied to prevent joinder outside the limitation period where the owner or driver had been served with a copy of the claim, as section 55 requires, within it. The site’s National Court series has a general article on amending after the limitation period expires.
Applications to the Commissioner and the court for an extension of time can take months. If the limitation date is approaching, the writ should be filed before it passes even while the extension application is pending; an action filed without a notice may be dismissed, but a fresh action can be filed once notice is given, provided the limitation period has not expired. An action filed after the limitation date cannot be saved at all.
Sources
- Frauds and Limitations Act 1988 — s 16(1)
- Wrongs (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (Chapter 297) — ss 31, 37(6)
- Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act (Chapter 295) — ss 54(5), 54(6), 55. Not on PacLII.
- Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd v Kuri [2006] PGSC 7; SC825
- Kuri v Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd [2004] PGNC 48; N2759
- Ambo v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust [2002] PGSC 21; SC681
- Lipai v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust [1996] PGLawRp 742; [1996] PNGLR 363
- Ambo v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust [1999] PGNC 124; N2162
- Lama v Motor Vehicle Insurance Ltd [2025] PGNC 461; N11612
- Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd v Kiangua [2015] PGSC 70; SC1476
- Pierce v Motor Vehicles Insurance (PNG) Trust [1989] PGLawRp 53; [1988-89] PNGLR 480
Before relying on anything here, read the current text of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act (Chapter 295) and check for later amendments. If a decision matters to you, get advice — start with the Office of the Public Solicitor, or find a firm in the law firms directory.