The damages judgments in MVIL cases follow a settled structure. Understanding it lets a claimant see what evidence is needed for each part of the claim, and lets a reader of the damages index compare like with like.
The governing principle
In Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd v Kol [2007] PGSC 38; SC902 the Supreme Court restated the foundation. Damages are compensation “in monetary terms not more or not less than what has actually been suffered or lost”, and the claimant must prove the loss. A student who had never earned anything was not entitled to past economic loss; a claim for future loss based on an unsupported assertion of K50 a week was set aside and replaced with a global K20,000 reflecting the real risks of his restricted employment prospects. General damages of K60,000 for an 80 to 100 per cent loss of use of a leg were upheld as not inordinately high or low.
The heads of damage
- General damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life, sometimes with a separate sum for loss of expectation of life. See general damages.
- Past economic loss: wages or income lost between the accident and the trial, proved by pay records or evidence of what the claimant earned.
- Future economic loss or loss of earning capacity: the diminution in what the claimant can earn for the rest of his working life, discounted to present value and for the vicissitudes of life. See loss of earning capacity.
- Special damages: medical expenses, travel, prostheses, care, funeral costs in a death claim, and customary outlays where proved. See special damages.
- Interest on the past components. See interest.
Kerr v MVIT [1979] PGLawRp 676; [1979] PNGLR 251 shows the structure at its fullest: the Supreme Court assessed ten separate heads for a paraplegic — pain and suffering K60,000, loss of expectation of life K1,500, paraplegic equipment K12,000, future economic loss K70,000, and so on — totalling K200,524.90. Most cases are simpler, and for villagers with no wage income the courts often make a global award combining general damages and economic loss, as in Tommy v MVIT [1991] PGNC 26; N1023 (K25,000 for fractures of both legs). See damages for a villager.
PNG standards and comparable verdicts
Kerr also fixed the yardstick. General damages are assessed “having regard to the prevailing condition of the plaintiff at the time of injury, and the general standards prevailing in the community” — Papua New Guinean standards, not Australian ones, following Dillingham v Diaz. In practice courts work from comparable verdicts: counsel cite earlier awards for similar injuries and the judge places the case within the range. The judgments are therefore full of cross-references, which is why an index of awards by injury type is useful.
Old awards must be adjusted for inflation. In Oni v MVIT [2004] PGNC 16; N2767 a 1987 comparable of K15,000 was more than doubled to K40,000. The Supreme Court in Moka v MVIL [2004] PGSC 38; SC729 recognised that awards of the 1980s and 1990s are outdated, and in Pioro v MVIL [2022] PGNC 235; N9667 the National Court increased a 1990s comparable of K10,000 by 200 per cent to K30,000, saying that the trial judge in an earlier case had erred by increasing an old award “by well short of even a one hundred percent increase”. A claimant citing a 1991 case for a leg fracture should expect the court to multiply it.
Everything must be proved, even after default judgment
Default judgment on liability does not dispense with proof of damages. Pelen v MVIL [2026] PGNC 249; N11980, following Kol, held that “entry of default judgment on liability does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to damages as the damages must still be established on the evidence”; special damages pleaded but not proved by documents were refused, and the claim for economic loss was refused, leaving general damages of K60,000 and interest. In MVIL v Kiangua [2015] PGSC 70; SC1476 the Supreme Court held that after default judgment “the statement of claim serves as proxy” for the judgment, so a head of damage not pleaded — funeral expenses — could not be awarded. Medical evidence must come from the treating doctor: see medical evidence.
Deductions, then the cap
From the total the court deducts any contributory negligence percentage (explained earlier), any Basic Protection Compensation already paid on a death, and customary compensation received from the driver’s side (Wisi v MVIT [1992] PGNC 12; N1040). Only then is the K150,000 cap applied to the damages, with interest and costs added on top: Yakupi v MVIL [2006] PGNC 214; N2981 (K412,000 assessed, K150,000 awarded plus K11,103.20 interest). The excess, if the owner or driver has been joined, is awarded against them under section 54(5); see what happens if damages exceed the limit.
Appeals on quantum
The Supreme Court will not disturb a trial judge’s assessment “unless we are of the view that the amount awarded is so inordinately high that it is a wrong estimate of the damages”, or so inordinately low: MVIT v Tabanto [1995] PGSC 16; [1995] PNGLR 214, where K12,000 for a hand injury was reduced to K8,000; Kerr, where K35,000 for paraplegia was increased to K60,000. Nor will it increase an award without a cross-appeal, as Kol and Pioro both note.
Sources
- Motor Vehicles Insurance Ltd v Kol [2007] PGSC 38; SC902
- Kerr v MVIT [1979] PGLawRp 676; [1979] PNGLR 251
- Tommy v MVIT [1991] PGNC 26; N1023
- Oni v MVIT [2004] PGNC 16; N2767; Moka v MVIL [2004] PGSC 38; SC729; Pioro v MVIL [2022] PGNC 235; N9667
- Pelen v MVIL [2026] PGNC 249; N11980; MVIL v Kiangua [2015] PGSC 70; SC1476
- Wisi v MVIT [1992] PGNC 12; N1040; Yakupi v MVIL [2006] PGNC 214; N2981
- MVIT v Tabanto [1995] PGSC 16; [1995] PNGLR 214
Before relying on anything here, read the current text of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act (Chapter 295) and check for later amendments. If a decision matters to you, get advice — start with the Office of the Public Solicitor, or find a firm in the law firms directory.